Willis v
Nicholson
[2007] EWCA Civ 199 (CA) Buxton LJ
This case was seen as an opportunity to give general guidance on costs
capping. The appellant appealed against a decision of a Costs Judge
refusing to make a costs capping order but ordering that costs incurred
from a certain date up until the final determination of the claim should
not exceed the estimate provided by the respondent. It was held that
there were no grounds on which the Judge's decision could be disturbed.
The Judge had stated that one of the reasons for his refusal to make a
costs capping order was his concern about the time and costs that would
be involved in having a Costs Judge determine what the cap should be. At
the time three of the eight months for preparing the case had already
expired which would make any intervention by the Judge or a Costs Judge
difficult to apply in practice. The difficulty was much greater when at
an even later date the court was asked to adjust the respondent's costs
and adjust the respondent's preparation of the case
very
close to trial. The court took the opportunity to make general observations
about
cost capping orders. There had been observations by first instance Judges
that
orders should only be made in limited circumstances, for example Smart.
In contrast there had been various indications by other Judges
encouraging the use of cost capping, for example Griffiths, Leigh, King
Ledwood. The CA considered the
difference in opinion was in need of resolution. One element in the high
cost of litigation was undoubtedly the expectation as to the annual incomes
of the professionals who conducted it. The costs system could not do
anything about that because it assessed the proper charge for work on the
basis of the market rates
charged by professionals. It had been hoped when CPR came into force that
practice might change. No change had occurred. The reasonable amount per
hour of a professional's time continued to be determined by the market.
Therefore, the focus of costs limitation had to be the way on which the
professionals intended to conduct the case because the amount recoverable on
assessment was fixed as to rates by the standard amounts allowed. To limit
the way in which professionals intended to conduct a case was a delicate
matter. The court would have to be careful to select the right moment in the
litigation process for the consideration of a costs cap. There remained
serious doubts as to whether further guidance on costs
capping, if it were to be given at all, should emanate from the Court of
Appeal rather
than
being formulated by the CPR after extensive consultation. Therefore no
general guidance given, although a working party has now been set up chaired
by Jackson J to consider the matter further.
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